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1 Introduction 
Innovation-driven interfirm alliances are formal agreements between otherwise 
independent firms that contain explicit arrangements for (joint) research and development (R and 
D) and technology sharing. Descriptive evidence shows that innovation-driven alliances have 
become dramatically more prevalent over time (Hagedoorn 2002) and the empirical literature has 
followed suit. Available research is now extensive and centered on understanding alliance 
formation (e.g., Ahuja 2000b; Powell et al. 1996; Stuart 1998) and partner selection (e.g., Gulati 
1995; Rothaermel & Boeker 2008; Sytch et al. 2011), alliance organization (e.g., Oxley 1997; 
Oxley & Sampson 2004; Pisano 1989), and the performance consequences of alliances (e.g., 
Ahuja 2000a; Baum et al. 2000; Frankort 2016; Gomes-Casseres et al. 2006; Hagedoorn & 
Schakenraad 1994; Mowery et al. 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds 2004; Stuart 2000). 
The majority of the existing studies examining innovation-driven alliances have focused 
on establishing the consistency of empirical data with testable implications derived from theory. 
Far fewer provide a more basic description of the empirical data per se, and we are aware of no 
study methodically documenting a range of transaction-level alliance characteristics over time 
and across sectors. A comprehensive inventory of key facts about the characteristics of 
innovation-driven alliances is valuable, however, because it can broaden insight into this 
consequential phenomenon as well as uncovering trends, patterns, and relationships in need of 
explanation and further understanding. 
To make headway in this area, we use data drawn from the Cooperative Agreements and 
Technology Indicators (CATI) data set to document temporal trends and sectoral patterns in, as 
well as relationships among, four key alliance characteristics. Specifically, we summarize and 
analyze transaction-level data on cooperative form, sectoral scope, the number of partners, and 
geographic scope in a sample of 14,377 innovation-driven alliances established across a dozen 
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broad sectoral categories during the fifty-year period from 1957 to 2006. In a more forward-
looking fashion, we subsequently use our descriptive analyses to explore possible avenues for 
further research. 
We focus specifically on cooperative form, sectoral scope, the number of partners, and 
geographic scope in innovation-driven alliances because these characteristics are of substantive 
importance to partnering firms. Cooperative forms, as well as the governance structures they 
imply, have long been viewed as important levers conditioning collaborative benefits (e.g., Oxley 
1997; Pisano 1989). Similarly, sectoral scope—i.e., the number of technology fields targeted in 
an alliance—may constitute an important determinant of ex post cooperation (e.g., Hamel et al. 
1989; Khanna 1998), while the number of partners in an alliance can also meaningfully alter 
alliance outcomes (e.g., Davis 2016; Heidl et al. 2014; Li et al. 2012). Finally, much has been 
written about the geographic scope of alliances, for example, in terms of the diverging strategic 
concerns involved in domestic versus international alliances (e.g., Mowery 1998; Reich & 
Mankin 1986). 
By way of motivation, we first review representative prior studies supplying descriptive 
evidence on innovation-driven alliances. We then define and summarize our sample, after which 
we describe temporal trends and sectoral patterns in cooperative form, sectoral scope, the number 
of partners, and geographic scope at the alliance level. Next, we use a multivariate regression 
framework to explore correlates of, and relationships among, these four transaction-level alliance 
characteristics. Based on our descriptive analyses, we close by exploring a variety of further 
research directions. 
2 Prior literature and motivation 
Following some initial evidence on the existence of formal interfirm alliances focused on 
R and D (e.g., Berg & Friedman 1977; Harrigan 1985; Mariti & Smiley 1983; Pisano et al. 1988), 
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in the early 1990s scholars began documenting systematic descriptive data on such innovation-
driven alliances. Our review of this literature suggests that available evidence furnishes insight 
predominantly into one or multiple of the following six aspects: 
1. Alliance prevalence—i.e., how the propensity to engage in innovation-driven alliances varies 
over time and/or across sectors. 
2. Cooperative form—i.e., whether innovation-driven alliances are governed by an equity-based 
joint venture or a nonequity contractual agreement. 
3. Internationalization—i.e., the extent to which innovation-driven alliances involve partner 
firms from distinct home countries. 
4. Key players—i.e., which firms are most actively engaging in innovation-driven alliances? 
5. Motivations—i.e., what are the major motivations for firms to engage in innovation-driven 
alliances? 
6. Network structure—i.e., what are some of the key features of the aggregated network of 
innovation-driven alliances? 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
Table 1 shows twenty prior studies providing systematic descriptive evidence on 
innovation-driven alliances published since 1992, for each indicating which of the above six 
aspects were covered. The studies have applied sampling windows spanning an average of about 
fifteen years, often covering the 1980s and 1990s. Also, while cooperative forms and geographic 
scope have each previously been documented in some detail (i.e., Cooperative forms and 
Internationalization in Table 1), we note an apparent lack of emphasis on sectoral scope and 
numbers of partners at the alliance level. Moreover, cooperative forms have typically been treated 
rather coarsely as discrete governance alternatives (i.e., equity versus nonequity), even though 
alliances within either governance category can come in distinct forms. Finally, few have 
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explored relationships among the cooperative form, sectoral scope, number of partners, and 
geographic scope of innovation-driven alliances. 
Based on these observations, we add to available descriptive research by extending the 
sampling window to a total of fifty years from 1957 to 2006, and by focusing on temporal trends 
and sectoral patterns in, as well as relationships among, a number of transaction-level 
characteristics of innovation-driven alliances—specifically, cooperative form, sectoral scope, the 
number of partners, and geographic scope. We orient our descriptive analyses around two 
questions. The first is this: What are some of the major temporal trends and sectoral patterns in 
cooperative forms, sectoral scope, numbers of partners, and geographic scope in innovation-
driven alliances? In addition, transaction-level alliance characteristics conceivably comprise an 
interdependent system of decisions (Li et al. 2008; Oxley 2009), which perhaps explains some of 
the broader trends and patterns in the data. Hence our second question: To what extent are 
cooperative forms, sectoral scope, numbers of partners, and geographic scope related at the level 
of individual alliances, and to what extent do such relationships account for the major trends and 
patterns in innovation-driven alliances? 
3 Data and sample 
We use alliance data drawn from the CATI data set, a well-established, comprehensive, 
and widely-used source of data on innovation-driven interfirm alliances (Hagedoorn 2002). 
While the CATI data set clearly captures only a sample of innovation-driven alliances, in a recent 
study Schilling (2009) concluded that the CATI data were strongly consistent with other large 
data sets (e.g., SDC, RECAP) in sectoral composition, alliance activity over time, and geographic 
participation. A unique feature of the CATI data set, however, is its unusually extensive 
longitudinal coverage that starts several decades before most other data sets. 
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Here, we consider alliances in the CATI data set established during the fifty-year period 
from 1957 to 2006, and focus specifically on alliances organized under one of the following five 
cooperative forms, three of which are nonequity forms and two of which are equity forms: 
1. The research and development contract (RDC), a nonequity alliance in which one firm 
performs R and D financed by the other. 
2. The joint development agreement (JDA), a nonequity alliance in which firms collaborate to 
develop new technology, products, or processes. 
3. The joint research pact (JRP), a nonequity alliance in which firms undertake research 
projects with shared resources, such as a new lab. 
4. The joint venture (JV), an equity alliance with arrangements for the mutual transfer of 
technology or joint research, in which partner firms (the parents) combine their economic 
interests in a separate firm (the child). 
5. The research corporation (RC), an equity alliance with the sole purpose of undertaking 
specific research programs, in which partner firms (the parents) combine their economic 
interests in a separate firm (the child). 
Across these five cooperative forms, our analysis sample contains a grand total of 14,377 
innovation-driven alliances involving 10,254 (mostly business) entities, which hereafter we will 
simply refer to as ‘firms’. A minority of the sampled alliances (698 or 4.86 percent) contain 
elements of multiple cooperative forms. Among those, the overwhelming majority (686 or 98.28 
percent) combine a RDC with a JDA. To obtain five sets of cooperative forms that are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive, we categorized such alliances as JDAs, the more intensive 
of the two forms. In all sampled alliances, 2,087 (14.52 percent) are RDCs; 8,769 (60.99 percent) 
are JDAs; 286 (1.99 percent) are JRPs; 3,122 (21.72 percent) are JVs; and 113 (0.79 percent) are 
RCs. 
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 Beyond cooperative form, we also have information on the sectoral focus of each alliance. 
Sectoral focus is based on an alliance-level coding of the distinct field(s) of technology covered 
by an individual alliance, which we aggregated into twelve categories: (1) biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals; (2) information technology; (3) aerospace and defense; (4) new materials; (5) 
instruments and medical equipment; (6) automotive; (7) chemicals; (8) consumer electronics; (9) 
engineering, drilling, and mining; (10) electrical equipment; (11) food and beverage; and (12) 
other. Importantly, the sectoral focus of an alliance tells us nothing in principle about the industry 
affiliation(s) of the firms forming that alliance; it captures the sectoral focus of the alliance 
irrespective of the product market affiliations of the partners. For example, in the period 1985-
1994, Eastman Kodak was among the most prolific collaborators in biopharmaceutical alliances 
(Roijakkers & Hagedoorn 2006, p. 441), despite its predominant affiliation to the photographic 
equipment and supplies industry. Most alliances have a narrow sectoral scope, focusing their 
activities on one sector (13,231 or 92.03 percent), while some have a broad sectoral scope, 
focusing on two sectors (1,078 or 7.50 percent), or three or four sectors (68 or 0.47 percent). 
In addition, we have information on the number of partners in each alliance and their 
home countries. In all alliances, most are dyadic alliances established between two firms (12,960 
or 90.14 percent); another 946 (6.58 percent) are triadic multipartner alliances established among 
three firms; and the remaining 471 alliances (3.28 percent) are multipartner alliances among four 
or more firms. In terms of geographic scope, 6,372 alliances (44.32 percent) are among firms 
with identical home countries, while 8,005 (55.68 percent) are international alliances in which the 
partner firms together represent at least two distinct home countries. Firms located in the USA 
dominate in our sample, as 10,313 alliances (71.73 percent) involve at least one US firm, 
followed at a distance by Japanese firms, which are involved in 2,527 alliances (17.58 percent). 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
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Before assessing key alliance characteristics in more detail, we briefly characterize the 
frequency of alliance formations over time and across sectors. Figure 1 shows annual numbers of 
newly established alliances from 1957 to 2006, as well as annual shares of alliances in all high-
tech sectors (i.e., alliances with a sectoral focus on biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, 
information technology, aerospace and defense, and/or new materials) in all newly established 
alliances. The number of newly established alliances has increased markedly over time; 
innovation-driven alliances were relatively rare until the mid-1970s, while alliance activity began 
to take serious shape only after 1975. Figure 1 also shows that the share of alliances in high-tech 
sectors has increased sharply over time, from mostly (well) below fifty percent until the late 
1970s to around ninety percent since the early 2000s. Among high-tech sectors, information 
technology consistently witnessed the highest level of alliance activity until the turn of the 
century, after which biotechnology and pharmaceuticals took the lead, with numbers of newly 
established alliances increasing by over 160 percent between 2000 and 2006. 
4 Trends and patterns in alliance characteristics 
We now turn our attention to alliance characteristics and focus specifically on cooperative 
form, sectoral scope, the number of partners, and geographic scope. We first outline temporal 
trends and then discuss sectoral patterns. 
4.1 Temporal trends 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
 Starting with cooperative forms, Figure 2 shows annual shares of equity alliances (JVs 
and RCs), RDCs, JDAs, and JRPs in all newly established alliances during the sampling window. 
We combine JVs and RCs into one category due to the low rate of occurrence of RCs even 
among equity alliances. Equity alliances dominated from 1963 until the end of the 1970s 
(variance in the period until 1962 is attributable to low numbers of newly established alliances—
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four point five on average per year), though the decline in equity alliances signified the 
progressive prevalence of nonequity alliances since 1966. The share of equity alliances continued 
to drop until the end of the sampling window, eventually falling consistently below thirty percent 
since 1990, below twenty percent since 1994, and below ten percent since 2001. 
Counterbalancing this decline in equity alliances was an increase in nonequity forms, which was 
initially concentrated in JDAs, reaching a peak in 1995 at about eighty-four percent, after which 
RDCs rapidly became more prevalent. JDAs consistently represented the most prevalent 
cooperative form among nonequity alliances, while JRPs were relatively uncommon throughout 
the sampling window. 
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
Figure 3 shows how the sectoral scope, number of partners, and geographic scope of 
alliances evolved over the sampling window. First, the share of multisector alliances—i.e., 
alliances with a broad sectoral scope, focusing their activities on at least two sectoral 
categories—was generally low until the beginning of the 1990s but consistently above ten 
percent since 1995, eventually reaching eighteen percent (163 out of 911 alliances) in 2006. 
Second, after some early peaks at around thirty percent, the share of multipartner alliances—i.e., 
alliances among at least three firms—declined gradually over time, stabilizing at around six 
percent since 1999. Third, the share of international alliances—i.e., alliances in which partner 
firms together represent at least two home countries—was mostly above fifty percent, with some 
evidence of a gradual decline between 1976 (seventy-six percent) and 1999 (forty-six percent), 
yet followed by an increase since, to about fifty-nine percent in 2006. 
4.2 Sectoral patterns 
Table 2 shows the four alliance characteristics disaggregated by time period in each of the 
eleven sectoral categories. We omit the ‘other’ category as it contains only thirty-one alliances. 
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--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 In terms of cooperative forms, two observations stand out. First, the decrease in the share 
of equity alliances (JVs and RCs) is evident across all sectors and virtually exclusively due to a 
drop in the prevalence of JVs, with no clearly discernible trend in RCs. Second, while nonequity 
JDAs compensate for the drop in the share of equity alliances in most sectors, RDCs 
disproportionally became the nonequity form of choice in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 
and, to a lesser extent, chemicals. Together, the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 as well as Table 
2 suggest that the steep growth in overall alliance activity was driven mostly by JDAs in 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals as well as information technology, and progressively by 
RDCs in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, especially since 2000. 
 The increase in firms’ preference for broad-scope, multisector alliances (Figure 3) is 
evident across all sectors, though it clearly varies in extent. In addition, our categorization of 
sectors is broad and a more granular division into subsectors would provide additional nuance. 
For example, even if the activities of an alliance in information technology do not span sectors, 
they might span IT subsectors such as computers, microelectronics, or software. Because such 
granular combinations are possible, the ‘Multisector’ measure in Figure 3 and Table 2 is best 
viewed as a lower bound on the extent to which alliances spanned fields of technology. 
 While sector-level shares of multipartner alliances do not show much of a consistent 
pattern, such alliances were consistently more prevalent in aerospace and defense. Moreover, the 
relative decline in multipartner alliances in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals appears to have 
shaped the somewhat negative trend in Figure 3. Finally, over half of all alliances in most sectors 
were of the international kind, though alliances in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, 
information technology, new materials, and instruments and medical equipment were 
comparatively less likely international. 
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5 Relationships among alliance characteristics 
5.1 Predicting alliance characteristics 
Having mapped the cooperative form, sectoral scope, number of partners, and geographic 
scope of alliances each separately over time and across sectors, we now turn to a more systematic 
assessment of some possible correlates of these four characteristics at the level of individual 
transactions. Within a multivariate linear probability framework, we first model the four alliance 
characteristics as a function of one another, and of sectors, time, and several control variables. 
Modeling relationships among the alliance characteristics is motivated by the idea that choices 
regarding cooperative form, sectoral scope, the number of partners, and geographic scope 
conceivably comprise an interdependent system of simultaneous decisions at the level of 
individual alliances (Oxley 2009). Subsequently, with additional covariates, we are able to assess 
whether and how choices regarding cooperative form, sectoral scope, the number of partners, and 
geographic scope (still) vary over time and across sectors after accounting for possible 
relationships among the four characteristics. 
 In general form, we estimate the following system of equations: 
Equity = β0 + β1Multisector + β2Multipartner + β3International + β4DSector + β5DTime + 
β6Controls + ε1,        (1) 
Multisector = γ0 + γ1Equity + γ2Multipartner + γ3International + γ4DSector + γ5DTime + 
γ6Controls + ε2,        (2) 
Multipartner = λ0 + λ1Equity + λ2Multisector + λ3International + λ4DSector + λ5DTime + 
λ6Controls + ε3,        (3) 
International = φ0 + φ1Equity + φ2Multisector + φ3Multipartner + φ4DSector + φ5DTime + 
φ6Controls + ε4,        (4) 
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where Equity is an indicator variable that equals one if the alliance is equity based and equals 
zero otherwise. For parsimony, we collapse the five cooperative forms into two categories of 
governance structures. In Section 5.2, however, we hone in on more granular differences among 
the three nonequity forms. Multisector is an indicator variable that equals one if the alliance 
focuses its activities on multiple broad sectoral categories and equals zero otherwise. 
Multipartner is an indicator variable that equals one if the alliance is among more than two 
partners and equals zero otherwise. International is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
partner firms in the alliance together represent at least two distinct home countries and, similarly, 
equals zero otherwise. DSector is a vector of dummies for high-tech sectors and all other sectors 
are the reference. Moreover, DTime is a vector of dummies for 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, and 
2000-06, while 1957-69 is the reference. Finally, Controls is a vector of controls for the location 
of partner firms, general and partner-specific alliance experience, and unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity. We define all control variables in the Appendix, and Panel A in Table A1 
summarizes all variables. 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
 Table 3 shows seemingly unrelated linear probability estimates of the above system of 
Eqs. (1) through (4). Seemingly unrelated estimation is preferable because it allows the error 
terms εi to correlate across equations, which amounts to assuming that unexplained variance in an 
individual equation shares some common component with that in others. Supplementary analyses 
revealed that logistic regression estimates give similar conclusions, with only few exceptions. To 
facilitate comparison, Table 3 shows two sets of estimates, one without control variables and 
another including all controls. 
Model 1 shows that equity alliances are more likely to be multisector, multipartner, and 
international, while multipartner alliances are more likely to be equity based, multisector, and 
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international, holding all other variables constant. At the same time, multisector alliances are 
more likely to be equity based and multipartner, while they appear no more or less likely to be 
international. Similarly, international alliances are more likely to be equity based and 
multipartner, while appearing no more or less likely to be multisector. 
Model 1 also shows that alliances in the four high-tech sectors, compared to all others, are 
consistently less likely to be equity based and more likely to be multisector, with equity 
governance least likely in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, and a broad sectoral scope most 
likely in new materials. Moreover, alliances in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are less likely, 
and those in information technology and particularly aerospace and defense more likely, to be 
multipartner than those in non-high-tech sectors. Also, alliances in aerospace and defense are 
more likely, and those in other high-tech sectors less likely, to be international than those in non-
high-tech sectors. These sectoral effects appear consistent with the descriptive data in Table 2. 
In terms of temporal effects, even after accounting for relationships among the four 
alliance characteristics as well as sectors, Model 1 shows that alliances over time became 
progressively less likely to be equity based and eventually less likely to be multipartner, while 
initially becoming less but eventually more likely to be multisector relative to 1957-69, the 
reference period. Finally, alliances became progressively more likely to be international, holding 
other variables constant. Like the sector effects, the temporal effects are remarkably consistent 
with the descriptive data shown in Figures 2 and 3, the temporal trend for International 
presenting the only exception. Supplementary analyses revealed that the ambiguous trend in 
geographic scope (Figure 3) turns positive as soon as we account for the simultaneity of 
geographic scope with decisions on cooperative form, sectoral scope, and the number of partners. 
More conservatively, Model 2 accounts for a number of control variables, leaving most 
results unchanged, with three exceptions. First, the coefficient for the information technology 
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dummy in Eq. (3), the Multipartner equation, reduces considerably in magnitude. Second, the 
slight reduction in the probability of an alliance being multisector in the 1980s disappears and 
apparently captured previously uncontrolled effects of partner-specific experience and a number 
of sources of firm-level heterogeneity. Third, the reduction in the probability of a multipartner 
alliance now has an earlier onset, in the 1990s. Despite their decreasing likelihood, however, a 
supplementary analysis revealed that multipartner alliances still involved as much as sixteen 
percent of all firms establishing alliances during 2000-06. 
The results in this section suggest two conclusions. First, reciprocal and positive 
relationships among most of the four alliance characteristics underscore the notion that these 
characteristics are part of an interdependent system of simultaneous decisions (Oxley 2009). 
Second, temporal trends and sectoral patterns persist that cannot be attributed to relationships 
among the four alliance characteristics, firm location, firms’ general and partner-specific alliance 
experience, or unobserved heterogeneity in firm-level tendencies to establish alliances with 
particular characteristics. 
5.2 Predicting nonequity forms 
 Among other things, Section 5.1 shows that a number of factors systematically predict 
whether or not an alliance is organized under an equity-based form of governance. However, 
among nonequity alliances in particular, more granular differences exist in the kinds of 
cooperative forms that firms choose (Figure 2 and Table 2). Therefore, we now focus on the 
sampled nonequity alliances, by modeling partner firms’ choice among the three nonequity forms 
as a function of sectoral scope, numbers of partners, and geographic scope, as well as sectors, 
time, and several control variables. Specifically, we estimate the following multinomial logistic 
regression specification: 
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ln(Pi / P0) = β0 + β1Multisector + β2Multipartner + β3International + β4DSector + β5DTime + 
β6Controls + ε,        (5) 
where P0 is the probability that the alliance is an RDC, while Pi is the probability that the alliance 
is of cooperative form i, possible cooperative forms being the JDA (i = 1) and the JRP (i = 2). 
Multisector, Multipartner, International, and DSector are defined as in Section 5.1. DTime is a 
vector of dummies for 1980-89, 1990-99, and 2000-06. Thus, we now use 1957-79 as the 
reference because variation in some outcome categories is negligible across 1957-69 and 1970-
79. Finally, Controls remains a vector of controls for the location of partner firms, general and 
partner-specific alliance experience, and unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. However, we 
adjust controls for partner-specific experience and unobserved heterogeneity to align with the 
new set of outcome categories. We document these adjustments in the Appendix, and Panel B in 
Table A1 summarizes all variables. 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
 Table 4 shows multinomial logistic regression estimates of Eq. (5). Similar to Table 3, we 
show two sets of estimates, one without control variables and another including all controls. 
Model 1 shows that multisector and multipartner alliances are more likely to be JDAs rather than 
RDCs, while multipartner and international alliances are more likely to be JRPs rather than either 
alternative form. Multisector alliances appear no more or less likely than narrow-scope, single-
sector alliances to be JRPs rather than RDCs. Model 1 also shows systematic sector effects: 
alliances in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are relatively more likely to be RDCs, while 
those in information technology and new materials are progressively more likely to be JDAs and 
JRPs. Time dummies show that, over time, alliances became less likely to be JDAs or JRPs 
compared to RDCs. These findings are broadly consistent with the descriptive data in Figure 2 
and Table 2. 
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 Model 2 includes all control variables, which affects two results. First, the coefficient for 
the biotechnology and pharmaceuticals sector in the JRP column reduces considerably in 
magnitude. Supplementary analysis revealed that, in this sector, systematic differences in the 
probability that an alliance is an RDC versus a JRP are due to underlying factors captured by 
partner-specific and firm-level experience effects. Second, the temporal trends all but disappear, 
except for the fact that JRPs are less likely than RDCs to be the cooperative form of choice 
during 2000-06 relative to 1957-79. Therefore, a comparison with Table 3 implies that though a 
strong temporal trend exists in firms’ broad choice of equity versus nonequity forms, when 
looking at the choice among nonequity forms per se (Table 4), variance appears largely due to 
more micro, relational or firm-level, factors. 
6 Further research directions 
 In this section, we build on insights from our descriptive analyses to explore a variety of 
further research directions. 
6.1 Progressive dominance of nonequity alliances 
The surge in innovation-driven alliances has overwhelmingly been due to an increase in 
the formation of nonequity alliances in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals as well as information 
technology sectors. Prior studies have suggested that the general preference for nonequity rather 
than equity alliances in high-tech sectors may reflect firms’ desire for comparatively flexible 
arrangements that enable efficient responses to uncertain sector dynamics (e.g., Santoro & 
McGill 2005). However, with limited systematic evidence to suggest that sectors have broadly 
become more dynamic (e.g., McNamara et al. 2003), why has the share of nonequity alliances in 
all newly established alliances continued to increase so dramatically (Figure 2 and Table 3) and 
across all sectors (Table 2)? 
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One might argue that the general and partner-specific experience accumulated by firms 
and their negotiators and legal counsel has perhaps led to more detailed alliance contracts with 
additional contingency clauses (Ryall & Sampson 2009), substituting the need for more 
hierarchical governance structures, such as equity joint ventures. Yet, Model 2 in Table 3 
accounts for general and specific experience effects, while the temporal pattern in governance 
structures persists. Therefore, we suspect that formal and informal institutional forces play an 
important role, either by supplying outside mechanisms shifting the comparative costs of 
governance (Williamson 1991), or by affecting perceptions of the lawfulness and appropriateness 
of alternative interorganizational forms (Scott 2014). 
In terms of formal institutions, for example, intellectual property protection has improved 
in major alliance markets, such as the US, Japan, and Europe (Park 2008). Moreover, in the early 
1980s US antitrust and EU competition authorities began treating pre-competitive collaborative R 
and D more leniently, allowing a greater variety of cooperative forms beyond traditional joint 
ventures, and later also a broader range of downstream joint development efforts (Lundqvist 
2015). Informal institutional forces too can play a role. For example, the growing network of 
alliances may serve as a reputation mechanism that allows firms to substitute nonequity for 
equity alliances (Frankort 2013), while mimetic isomorphism may have impelled firms to follow 
early adopters of nonequity governance structures. 
Overall, the dramatic change in the nature of alliance governance, while the subject of 
some narrative speculation, has received limited systematic attention and we believe it would be 
valuable to juxtapose a handful of plausible explanations. Such research can advance insight into 
the historical contingency of alliance governance, while also improving the understanding of the 
diverse channels through which the broader institutional environment interacts with the 
mechanisms of (alliance) governance. 
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6.2 Heterogeneity in nonequity alliances 
The proliferation of nonequity alliances was largely the result of increases in RDCs and 
JDAs, while the choice among nonequity forms does not reveal a clear temporal pattern once 
accounting for other factors. The progressive dominance of nonequity alliances suggests the need 
for a more granular understanding of differences within the class of nonequity alliances. 
From a governance perspective, for example, one might ask where kinds of nonequity 
alliances can be placed on the governance continuum (Williamson 1991). Among the forms we 
were able to distinguish, RDCs would be less hierarchical than JDAs and JRPs, the latter two 
which can rely on in-kind hostage exchanges (Oxley 1997). It is less clear a priori how JDAs and 
JRPs, which tend to cover distinct activity domains, differ in their governance attributes. JDAs 
typically join diverse perspectives (e.g., see the effects of Multisector in Table 4) for downstream 
development, while JRPs often concern pre-competitive joint research. We expect to find great 
variance in governance attributes both within and across these nonequity forms, as a function of 
the specific adaptation requirements of the alliance partners. 
Identification of such governance attributes may ultimately require the study of alliance 
contracts, which is a promising way to develop a more granular and systematic understanding of 
heterogeneity in nonequity alliances (e.g., Reuer & Devarakonda 2016; Ryall & Sampson 2009). 
By revealing governance attributes that influence the adaptive capacities of contract-based 
nonequity alliances, the study of contracts can lead to more refined applications of the 
governance continuum. For example, Reuer and Devarakonda (2016) identified administrative 
committees as one way of introducing administrative controls into nonequity alliances, showing 
that partners were more likely to devise administrative committees where the need for 
coordinated adaptation was greater. We believe such refinements also permit useful analyses of 
performance heterogeneity among nonequity alliances. For example, opportunities exist to 
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connect governance attributes of nonequity alliances (e.g., the presence of an administrative 
committee) to relevant outcomes (e.g., interfirm knowledge transfer). 
Beyond governance attributes, apparently similar nonequity alliances can vary greatly in 
their underlying objectives and we know less about whether and how collaborative tasks are 
organized in distinct ways as a consequence. We believe there is intrinsic value in a more 
systematic categorization of objectives in innovation-driven alliances that goes beyond an 
upstream-downstream dichotomy. In parallel, we concur with Albers et al. (2016) in encouraging 
work that develops a greater understanding of the organizational designs of alliances (as distinct 
from their legal basis per se) that can help achieve such objectives. 
6.3 Determinants and consequences of sectoral scope 
Alliances with broad sectoral scope have increased over time. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence is limited and mainly focused on vertical scope—i.e., whether one or multiple 
functional domains, such as R and D, manufacturing, or marketing, are part of a single alliance 
(Oxley & Sampson 2004). We are unaware of systematic research examining the number of 
technology fields targeted in an alliance (for an exception, see Oxley [1997]) and believe the 
determinants and consequences of the sectoral, horizontal scope of alliances constitute highly 
relevant open questions. Various alliance data sets, including CATI and RECAP, contain 
information on technology fields targeted in alliances, readily facilitating measurement of this 
dimension of alliance scope. While we have focused on broad sectors here, it would also be 
worthwhile for researchers to develop more granular measures of horizontal alliance scope. 
Alliance scope can materially affect alliance outcomes (Khanna 1998) and so sectoral 
scope plausibly has systematic implications at the transaction level. For example, a narrow 
sectoral scope may help bound exchange hazards in innovation-driven alliances (e.g., Hamel et 
al. 1989) and so a broad sectoral scope might be more likely where fewer hazards are anticipated. 
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In addition, it would be valuable to examine how sectoral scope shapes the extent and nature of 
the knowledge transferred between partners, as well as the technologies, products, and processes 
flowing from alliances. 
Additional questions emerge about the effects of sectoral scope at the relationship as well 
as firm levels. How is a multisector alliance between two firms similar to or different from 
multiple alliances between the same firms, each with a narrow scope yet in a different technology 
field? When looking for multisector collaboration, is it better to work with one partner in a 
number of technology fields, to form a broad-scope multipartner alliance, or to have a portfolio of 
targeted, narrow-scope alliances with multiple partners? We believe exploring these questions is 
worthwhile because it can yield new insights into the complex tradeoffs that firms face among 
strategic alternatives at fundamentally different levels—i.e., alliance, relationship, and portfolio. 
We also speculate that trends and patterns in the sectoral scope of alliances can be linked 
to processes of sectoral convergence. Examples include the convergence of telecom and 
computers sectors as well as the emergence of ‘neutraceuticals’ and functional foods that have 
progressively straddled biopharmaceuticals and food and beverage sectors (Hacklin et al. 2013). 
In these and other cases, are changes in the sectoral scope of alliances among the drivers of 
sectoral convergence, or are such changes precipitated by sectoral convergence instead? The 
literature on interfirm alliances can fruitfully connect to broader research on the dynamics of 
market categories (Negro et al. 2010) to uncover the collaborative underpinnings and 
consequences of emerging as well as waning sectoral categories. 
6.4 Interdependence among alliance characteristics 
 Choices regarding cooperative form, sectoral scope, the number of partners, and 
geographic scope comprise an interdependent system of simultaneous decisions. This finding 
underscores the inherently systemic nature of alliance organization that we believe empirical 
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alliance research has yet to take more seriously (for an exception, see Li et al. [2008]). For 
example, in the spirit of suggestions by Oxley (2009), we encourage research more rigorously 
addressing why, when, and how various alliance characteristics co-occur. 
It would also be valuable for studies of alliance performance to embrace causal 
complexity and explore the importance of configurations of multiple interdependent alliance 
characteristics to outcomes. Such investigations can exploit developments in configurational 
theory and qualitative comparative analysis to theorize and analyze how outcomes depend on 
multidimensional constellations of characteristics (Albers 2010; Misangyi et al. 2017). Among 
the opportunities presented by a configurational perspective is the potential to identify equifinal 
causal relations, where multiple distinct configurations of alliance characteristics generate similar 
outcomes. By offering great flexibility to consider not only multiple alliance characteristics but 
also relevant firm-level and external contingencies, a configurational approach can help close the 
gap between the complex reality faced by alliance practitioners and available evidence. 
Apart from studying configurations of characteristics and their consequences in samples 
of realized alliances, broader questions emerge about alliance characteristics in relation to search 
and selection processes inside firms. By taking as given a particular alliance partner, for example, 
existing studies implicitly conceive of alliance characteristics as disconnected from partner 
choice (Reuer et al. 2013), even as both may be endogenous to firms’ broader search and 
selection processes. Opportunities exist for integrating research on alliance management and 
governance with literatures on partner selection and organizational search to uncover the firm-
level processes that drive variation in the characteristics of realized alliances and their outcomes. 
Such research can also enhance the understanding of how partners are selected and alliances 
designed for their fit with a firm’s pre-existing strengths and weaknesses as well as its broader 
innovation portfolio, both within and beyond the alliance domain. 
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7 Conclusion 
Motivated by the objective to provide a comprehensive descriptive inventory of key facts 
about the characteristics of innovation-driven alliances, we have analyzed a sample of 14,377 
such alliances established during the fifty-year period from 1957 to 2006. We have placed the 
phenomenon of innovation-driven alliances front and center, while treading carefully in not 
letting specific theoretical lenses dictate our description of the data. We have also explored a 
variety of further research directions and hope that these, along with the descriptive evidence, 
offer an impetus for new empirical and theoretical research that extends and deepens our 
understanding of innovation-driven alliances. 
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Figure 1: Newly established alliances and shares of alliances in high-tech sectors, 1957-2006 
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Figure 2: Shares of equity alliances, RDCs, JDAs, and JRPs in all newly established alliances, 
1957-2006 
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Figure 3: Shares of alliances by characteristic in all newly established alliances, 1957-2006 
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Table 1: Descriptive evidence on innovation-driven alliances 
 
  
Author(s) Publication year Sectors
Sampling 
window
Alliance 
prevalence
Cooperative 
forms
Internationali-
zation Key players Motivations
Network 
structure
Barley et al. 1992 Biotechnology 1971-1989 X X X X
Cainarca et al. 1992 Information technology 1980-1986 X X
Hagedoorn & Schakenraad 1992 Information technology 1980-1989 X X
Hagedoorn 1993 Multiple sectors 1980-1989 X X
Hagedoorn 1995 Multiple sectors 1980-1989 X
Hagedoorn & Narula 1996 Multiple sectors 1980-1993 X X
Link 1996 Multiple sectors 1985-1994 X X
Vonortas 1997 Multiple sectors 1985-1995 X X X X
Hagedoorn 2002 Multiple sectors 1960-1998 X X X
Li & Zhong 2003 Multiple sectors 1995-2000 X X X
Powell et al. 2005 Biotechnology 1988-1999 X X
Cloodt et al. 2006 Computers 1970-1999 X X X
Roijakkers & Hagedoorn 2006 Biopharmaceuticals 1975-1999 X X X
Rosenkopf & Schilling 2007 Multiple sectors 2001-2003 X
Schilling & Phelps 2007 Multiple sectors 1990-2000 X
Schilling 2009 Multiple sectors 1990-2005 X X
Cloodt et al. 2010 Software 1970-1999 X X X
Bojanowski et al. 2012 Multiple sectors 1989-2002 X
Schilling 2015 Multiple sectors 1990-2005 X X
Tatarynowicz et al. 2016 Multiple sectors 1983-1999 X
Aspects of innovation-driven alliances
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Table 2: Alliance characteristics by sector, 1957-2006a 
 
Sector Years Multisector Multipartner International
RDC JDA JRP JV RC
Biotechnology & 1957-69 2 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
pharmaceuticals 1970-79 52 0.29 0.37 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.42
1980-89 719 0.23 0.50 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.49
1990-99 1,328 0.21 0.64 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.55
2000-06 2,654 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.53
Information 1957-69 20 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.55
technology 1970-79 124 0.01 0.26 0.04 0.69 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.49
1980-89 1,312 0.04 0.58 0.04 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.59
1990-99 2,363 0.02 0.85 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.45
2000-06 1,320 0.03 0.81 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.24 0.10 0.58
Aerospace & defense 1957-69 12 0.08 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.08 0.08 0.50 0.67
1970-79 72 0.01 0.64 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.54
1980-89 216 0.09 0.73 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.56
1990-99 419 0.04 0.70 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.67
2000-06 205 0.08 0.80 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.67
New materials 1957-69 10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.80 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.80
1970-79 36 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.69
1980-89 423 0.03 0.47 0.02 0.44 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.52
1990-99 358 0.02 0.66 0.02 0.29 0.01 0.38 0.13 0.54
2000-06 184 0.07 0.76 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.71 0.11 0.53
Instruments & 1957-69 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.33
medical equipment 1970-79 13 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.77 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.54
1980-89 91 0.07 0.47 0.03 0.43 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.74
1990-99 161 0.09 0.78 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.57 0.10 0.43
2000-06 311 0.13 0.79 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.55 0.04 0.45
Automotive 1957-69 6 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.67
1970-79 39 0.08 0.49 0.03 0.41 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.72
1980-89 209 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.77
1990-99 240 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.28 0.01 0.21 0.20 0.52
2000-06 246 0.04 0.65 0.02 0.27 0.01 0.24 0.11 0.67
Chemicals 1957-69 29 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.86
1970-79 148 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.94 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.72
1980-89 346 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.83 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.79
1990-99 481 0.14 0.53 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.64
2000-06 207 0.27 0.57 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.43 0.05 0.54
Consumer electronics 1957-69 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.86
1970-79 29 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.83
1980-89 66 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.82
1990-99 87 0.00 0.83 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.54 0.23 0.49
2000-06 134 0.01 0.78 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.65 0.09 0.60
Engineering, drilling, 1957-69 17 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.47
& mining 1970-79 25 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.60
1980-89 113 0.07 0.45 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.67
1990-99 157 0.03 0.82 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.44 0.20 0.58
2000-06 99 0.20 0.69 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.68 0.06 0.53
Electrical equipment 1957-69 13 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15
1970-79 37 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.03 0.32 0.73
1980-89 123 0.03 0.44 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.04 0.24 0.72
1990-99 75 0.00 0.79 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.16 0.52
2000-06 73 0.08 0.75 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.30 0.07 0.60
Food & beverage 1957-69 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67
1970-79 18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.72
1980-89 39 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.56
1990-99 45 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.51
2000-06 40 0.25 0.48 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.55
N Cooperative forms
a. For each sector in each time period, the table shows the number of newly established alliances, shares of alliances of a particular cooperative form, and 
shares of multisector, multipartner, and international alliances in all alliances formed in that sector and that time period. RDC = research and development 
contract; JDA = joint development agreement; JRP = joint research pact; JV = joint venture; RC = research corporation.
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Table 3: Seemingly unrelated linear probability models of alliance characteristics, 1957-2006a 
 
  
Dependent variable: Equity Multisector Multipartner International Equity Multisector Multipartner International
Equity 0.058*** 0.030*** 0.314*** 0.054*** 0.025*** 0.230***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.011] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010]
Multisector 0.122*** 0.068*** 0.000 0.097*** 0.055*** -0.018
[0.012] [0.010] [0.016] [0.012] [0.009] [0.015]
Multipartner 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.115*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.072***
[0.011] [0.007] [0.014] [0.011] [0.008] [0.013]
International 0.177*** 0.000 0.041*** 0.132*** -0.003 0.029***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005]
Biotechnology & pharmaceuticals -0.232*** 0.110*** -0.051*** -0.034** -0.194*** 0.108*** -0.028*** -0.046***
[0.009] [0.006] [0.007] [0.012] [0.009] [0.006] [0.007] [0.011]
Information technology -0.181*** 0.142*** 0.021** -0.060*** -0.136*** 0.147*** 0.007 -0.028**
[0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.011] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011]
Aerospace & defense -0.209*** 0.142*** 0.155*** 0.045* -0.185*** 0.145*** 0.122*** 0.058***
[0.014] [0.009] [0.011] [0.018] [0.014] [0.009] [0.010] [0.017]
New materials -0.048*** 0.314*** 0.003 -0.092*** -0.054*** 0.308*** 0.007 -0.087***
[0.013] [0.009] [0.011] [0.018] [0.013] [0.009] [0.010] [0.017]
1970s -0.113** -0.033 -0.025 0.053 -0.153*** -0.024 -0.031 -0.030
[0.037] [0.025] [0.029] [0.049] [0.036] [0.025] [0.027] [0.046]
1980s -0.346*** -0.056* -0.017 0.148** -0.343*** -0.037 -0.029 0.045
[0.034] [0.024] [0.027] [0.046] [0.034] [0.023] [0.025] [0.043]
1990s -0.552*** 0.033 -0.038 0.143** -0.486*** 0.043 -0.051* 0.091*
[0.034] [0.024] [0.027] [0.046] [0.034] [0.024] [0.026] [0.043]
2000s -0.617*** 0.085*** -0.065* 0.212*** -0.533*** 0.077** -0.063* 0.154***
[0.034] [0.024] [0.028] [0.046] [0.034] [0.024] [0.026] [0.043]
USA -0.062*** -0.000 -0.007 0.076***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009]
Japan -0.021* -0.003 -0.002 0.244***
[0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011]
General alliance experience -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.051***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Partner-specific nonequity experience -0.047***
[0.010]
Partner-specific equity experience 0.052***
[0.013]
Partner-specific alliance experience 0.002 0.221***
[0.005] [0.005]
Autoregression (equity) 0.339***
[0.017]
Autoregression (multisector) 0.441***
[0.023]
Autoregression (multipartner) 0.067***
[0.019]
Autoregression (international) 0.580***
[0.015]
Constant 0.770*** -0.082*** 0.103*** 0.349*** 0.854*** -0.079** 0.109*** 0.308***
[0.034] [0.024] [0.027] [0.046] [0.042] [0.024] [0.026] [0.045]
R 2 0.214 0.119 0.043 0.017 0.256 0.145 0.173 0.160
a. Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; N = 14,377.
(1) (2)
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Table 4: Multinomial logistic regression models of nonequity forms, 1957-2006a 
 
  
Outcome category: JDA JRP JDA JRP
Multisector 0.369** 0.095 0.239* -0.071
[0.115] [0.280] [0.117] [0.285]
Multipartner 0.799*** 1.991*** 0.467** 1.380***
[0.165] [0.214] [0.172] [0.232]
International 0.089 0.414** -0.005 0.297*
[0.055] [0.134] [0.059] [0.138]
Biotechnology & pharmaceuticals -1.468*** -1.051*** -1.000*** -0.218
[0.086] [0.221] [0.090] [0.233]
Information technology 1.183*** 1.758*** 1.064*** 1.537***
[0.112] [0.213] [0.115] [0.219]
Aerospace & defense 0.188 -0.351 0.142 -0.503
[0.164] [0.350] [0.166] [0.360]
New materials 0.785*** 1.095** 0.648** 0.900**
[0.208] [0.343] [0.209] [0.347]
1980s -0.215 -0.541 -0.136 -0.460
[0.254] [0.397] [0.261] [0.412]
1990s 0.251 -0.862* 0.358 -0.704
[0.251] [0.397] [0.258] [0.418]
2000s -0.729** -1.946*** -0.309 -1.303**
[0.248] [0.404] [0.256] [0.421]
USA -0.251*** -0.640***
[0.072] [0.152]
Japan 0.419*** -0.024
[0.101] [0.194]
General alliance experience -0.018 0.207***
[0.028] [0.062]
Partner-specific RDC experience 0.129 0.770
[0.251] [0.676]
Partner-specific JDA experience 0.933*** 1.097***
[0.211] [0.261]
Partner-specific JRP experience 0.221 0.039
[0.847] [0.882]
Partner-specific equity experience 1.053* 1.336**
[0.463] [0.496]
Autoregression (RDC) -2.577*** -6.707***
[0.153] [0.973]
Autoregression (JDA) -0.069 -0.977**
[0.120] [0.308]
Autoregression (JRP) 2.079** 5.125***
[0.773] [0.965]
Constant 2.185*** -1.089** 2.282*** -0.794
[0.254] [0.410] [0.264] [0.431]
Log likelihood
Pseudo R 2
a. Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; N = 11,142. The base category is the RDC (research and development 
contract).
(1) (2)
-5,366.55 -5,080.24
0.192 0.235
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Table A1: Summary statistics 
 
  
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Equity 0.225 0.418 0 1 - - - -
Research and development contract (RDC) - - - - 0.187 0.390 0 1
Joint development agreement (JDA) - - - - 0.787 0.409 0 1
Joint research pact (JRP) - - - - 0.026 0.158 0 1
Multisector 0.080 0.271 0 1 0.086 0.281 0 1
Multipartner 0.099 0.298 0 1 0.088 0.283 0 1
International 0.557 0.497 0 1 0.518 0.500 0 1
Biotechnology & pharmaceuticals 0.331 0.470 0 1 0.390 0.488 0 1
Information technology 0.357 0.479 0 1 0.375 0.484 0 1
Aerospace & defense 0.064 0.245 0 1 0.066 0.248 0 1
New materials 0.070 0.256 0 1 0.057 0.232 0 1
1970s 0.041 0.199 0 1 - - - -
1980s 0.252 0.434 0 1 0.193 0.394 0 1
1990s 0.363 0.481 0 1 0.392 0.488 0 1
2000s 0.335 0.472 0 1 0.397 0.489 0 1
USA 0.717 0.450 0 1 0.755 0.430 0 1
Japan 0.176 0.381 0 1 0.149 0.356 0 1
General alliance experience 1.836 1.401 0 5.628 1.893 1.417 0 5.628
   raw count 15.617 26.909 0 277 16.695 28.204 0 277
Partner-specific nonequity experience 0.130 0.438 0 5.037 - - - -
   raw count 0.431 3.226 0 153 - - - -
Partner-specific RDC experience - - - - 0.012 0.095 0 1.386
   raw count - - - - 0.018 0.148 0 3
Partner-specific JDA experience - - - - 0.119 0.417 0 4.860
   raw count - - - - 0.368 2.480 0 128
Partner-specific JRP experience - - - - 0.022 0.165 0 3.258
   raw count - - - - 0.049 0.511 0 25
Partner-specific equity experience 0.072 0.311 0 4.977 0.061 0.288 0 4.977
   raw count 0.194 1.799 0 144 0.163 1.749 0 144
Partner-specific alliance experience 0.169 0.509 0 5.697 - - - -
   raw count 0.625 4.817 0 297 - - - -
Autoregression (equity) 0.185 0.226 0 1 - - - -
Autoregression (multisector) 0.037 0.094 0 1 - - - -
Autoregression (multipartner) 0.109 0.147 0 1 - - - -
Autoregression (international) 0.380 0.288 0 1 - - - -
Autoregression (RDC) - - - - 0.107 0.188 0 1
Autoregression (JDA) - - - - 0.415 0.289 0 1
Autoregression (JRP) - - - - 0.020 0.054 0 1
Panel A: Full sample for analyses in Table 3 Panel B: Sample of nonequity alliances for analyses in Table 4
(N = 14,377) (N = 11,142)
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Appendix: Control variables and summary statistics 
A.1 Predicting alliance characteristics: Table 3 
Our first set of multivariate analyses models the four alliance characteristics as a function 
of one another, and of sectors, time, and a number of control variables. Panel A in Table A1 
summarizes all variables included in the analyses shown in Table 3. 
--- Insert Table A1 about here --- 
Control variables fall into three categories. First, we control for the geographic location of 
the partner firms to account for the preponderance of alliances involving US and Japanese firms. 
Specifically, USA is an indicator variable that equals one if at least one of the partners in an 
alliance has the USA as its home country and equals zero otherwise, while Japan is an indicator 
variable that equals one if at least one of the partners in an alliance has Japan as its home country 
and, similarly, equals zero otherwise. 
Second, we account for experience effects that might influence the characteristics of a 
focal alliance. General alliance experience captures the average of the cumulative number of 
alliances established across the partner firms before the year in which the focal alliance is 
established, logged to reduce skew. This variable captures systematic differences in the 
characteristics of alliances established among more compared to less experienced firms. We also 
control for partner-specific experience variables to absorb differences in the characteristics of 
alliances due to partner-specific learning effects and otherwise unobserved relational 
heterogeneity (Heckman & Borjas 1980). In Eq. (1), the Equity equation, Partner-specific 
nonequity experience captures the logarithm of the total number of nonequity alliances 
established among two or more of the partner firms before the year in which the focal alliance is 
established. Similarly, in the same equation, Partner-specific equity experience captures the 
logarithm of the total number of equity alliances established among two or more of the partner 
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firms before the year in which the focal alliance is established. In Eqs. (2) and (3), the 
Multisector and Multipartner equations, Partner-specific alliance experience captures the 
logarithm of the total number of alliances established among two or more of the partner firms 
before the year in which the focal alliance is established. We do not control for partner-specific 
experience in Eq. (4), the International equation, as firms’ home location is time invariant. 
Third, we include four control variables to account for non-independence across 
individual alliances, attributable to the fact that over 3,500 of the sampled firms appear as a 
partner in multiple alliances. We use Lincoln’s (1984) autoregression specification. In Eq. (1), 
Autoregression (equity) captures the mean of Equity for all alliances in which the partner firms 
appeared up until and including the focal year, yet excluding the focal alliance. In Eq. (2), 
Autoregression (multisector) captures the mean of Multisector for all alliances in which the 
partner firms appeared up until and including the focal year, yet excluding the focal alliance. In 
Eq. (3), Autoregression (multipartner) captures the mean of Multipartner for all alliances in 
which the partner firms appeared up until and including the focal year, yet excluding the focal 
alliance. In Eq. (4), Autoregression (international) captures the mean of International for all 
alliances in which the partner firms appeared up until and including the focal year, yet excluding 
the focal alliance. These four autoregression variables plausibly capture otherwise unobserved 
firm-level costs and benefits associated with establishing an alliance with particular 
characteristics. 
A.2 Predicting nonequity forms: Table 4 
Our second set of multivariate analyses models partner firms’ choice among the three 
nonequity forms as a function of sectoral scope, numbers of partners, and geographic scope, and 
of sectors, time, and a number of control variables. Our sample reduces to 11,142 alliances 
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because we focus exclusively on nonequity alliances. Panel B in Table A1 summarizes all 
variables included in the analyses shown in Table 4. 
Control variables again fall into three categories, and controls for the geographic location 
of the partner firms and general alliance experience remain unaltered. However, with one 
exception (Partner-specific equity experience), we replace all controls for partner-specific 
experience as well as non-independence to align with the new set of outcome categories. Partner-
specific RDC experience captures the logarithm of the total number of RDCs established among 
two or more of the partner firms before the year in which the focal alliance is established. 
Partner-specific JDA experience captures the logarithm of the total number of JDAs established 
among two or more of the partner firms before the year in which the focal alliance is established. 
Partner-specific JRP experience captures the logarithm of the total number of JRPs established 
among two or more of the partner firms before the year in which the focal alliance is established. 
Moreover, Autoregression (RDC) captures the average share of RDCs in all alliances in 
which the partner firms appeared up until and including the focal year, yet excluding the focal 
alliance. Autoregression (JDA) captures the average share of JDAs for all alliances in which the 
partner firms appeared up until and including the focal year, yet excluding the focal alliance. 
Autoregression (JRP) captures the average share of JRPs in all alliances in which the partner 
firms appeared up until and including the focal year, yet excluding the focal alliance. 
